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Temporary Employees and the
Exclusiveness-of-Remedy Provision
BY BRIAN C. BAUGH*
INTRODUCTION
Two employees are working side by side on an assembly line
located in a certain manufacturing plant. Employee number one
is a permanent employee of the plant, while Employee number two is a
contingent worker temporarily retained by the employer, or recipient
company, from a temporary employment agency such as Manpower
Temporary Services.' Employee number one is covered by the recipient
company's workers' compensation carrier; Employee number two is
covered under the temporary employment agency's workers' compensa-
tion carer. Suddenly a conveyor belt snaps and both employees suffer
injuries. Subsequently, it is learned that the cause of the accident may
have been the recipient company's negligence in failing to properly
maintain its equipment.
Employee number one's workers' compensation situation is typical
and well settled m Kentucky Because he is an employee of the compa-
* J.D. expected 1998, Umversity of Kentucky.
'See Carolyn Wiley, A Comparison of Seven National Temporary and
Staffing Agencies, EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ToDAY, June 22, 1995, at 69,
available in 1995 WL 12245761 (noting that "Manpower Temporary Services is
currently the largest staffing service It operates m 38 countries, employs
more than 1.5 million people in 2,000 offices, and serves close to 400,000
customers around the world every year.").
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ny,2 he is entitled to workers' compensation benefits.3 Tis is, of course,
a no-fault system, and in order to receive his benefits, Employee number
one will not have to prove his employer was negligent.4 In return for this
no-fault system of liability, section 342.690 of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes ("K.R.S.") provides the employer with immunity from a common
law action by the mjured employee.5 In other words, if Employee
number one has accepted workers' compensation coverage, K.R.S. §
342.690 precludes him from bringing a common law suit against his
employer.
6
Employee number two's situation. is a little more complex. Who will
be responsible for Ins or her injuries? Should Employee number two be
treated as an employee of the manufacturing plant, or as an employee of
the temporary employment agency 9 As noted above, Employee number
one must choose, usually at the beginning of employment, between opting
for workers' compensation coverage and electing to retain his or her
rights to sue the employer.7 Should Employee number two have to make
this choice as well, or should he or she be able to sue the manufacturing
plant and draw workers' compensation payments from the temporary
employment agency9 Would such a system be a "wmdfall" for the
temporary employee? Are Employee number one and Employee number
two considered equally valuable employees outside the context of
workers' compensation? Before the accident, were they treated the same?
If workers' compensation is the temporary worker's only remedy, is the
recipient company provided with adequate incentives to maintain a safe
working environment?
2 See KY. REv STAT. ANN. [hereinafter"K.R.S."] § 342.640 (Micie 1997)
(defining the numerous circumstances in which a worker is considered to be an
"employee" under Kentucky's workers' compensation provisions).
3 See id. § 342.6 10 (providing that "[e]veryemployer subject to this chapter
shall be liable for compensation for mjury, occupational disease, or death without
regard to fault as a cause of the injury "); see also id. § 342.630 (defining
what constitutes an "employer" for purposes of Kentucky's workers' compensa-
tion provisions).
4 See zd. § 342.6 10.
' See id. § 342.690. See mnfra note 41 for a discussion of tis provision.
6 See K.R.S. § 342.690. Employee number one's situation is beyond the
scope of this paper. The author assumes the reader is somewhat familiar with the
workers' compensation scheme for typical employees.
' See id. § 342.650 (stating that employees may elect to waive coverage
under Kentucky's workers' compensation chapter).
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In a typical leasing contract between a temporary employment agency
and a recipient company, the temporary employment agency is responsi-
ble for providing the worker with workers' compensation coverage as
well as a myriad of other employment services, such as Social Security
benefits.' Therefore, the law will usually make the employee look to the
employment agency, rather than to the recipient company, for workers'
compensation payments. The difficult question presented by this
triangular relationship is whether the temporary worker is an "employee"
of the recipient company Will the temporary employee simply be treated
as a regular employee for purposes of workers' compensation, and thus
be precluded from lobbying a common law suit for damages against the
recipient company9
The growth of contingent workers is testing traditional workers'
compensation laws. Temporary employment agencies are transforming
our perceptions of the typical employment relationship9 and challenging
the legal understanding of what constitutes an employee/employer
relationsip. One thing is very clear: employer demands for contingent
workers are on the rise, and this increasing demand will continue to be
met by labor brokers such as Manpower, Inc.'0 In light of the apparent
demand that businesses have for contingent workers, the law in tins area
should be thoughtfully developed so as to strike an appropriate balance
between the competing needs of a new, non-traditional workforce and
compaies that elect to utilize temporary workers.
The purpose of this Note is to examine this increasingly popular form
of employment and its effect on the traditional workings of Kentucky's
workers' compensation laws. Specifically, this Note examines whether an
injured temporary employee retains his or her right to bring a common
law action against the recipient company Part I will discuss the impact
the temporary employment relationship has had on the American
workforce." Part II will then trace Kentucky's limited judicial handling
of the way Kentucky workers' compensation law deals with temporary
s See Wiley, supra note 1.
9 See infra notes 15-36 (discussing how temporary employment is
transforming the traditional workplace).
'
0 See Kenneth A. Jenero & Mark A. Spognardi, Temporary Employment
Relationships: Review of the Jont EmployerDoctrine Under the NLRA (National
Labor Relations Act), EMPLOYEE REL. L.J., Autumn 1995, at 127, 135 ("The
trend toward the use of temporary employment relationships can be expected to
continue as employers seek neededhuman resource flexibility and cost reductions
to remain competitive."); see also Part I (infra notes 15-36).
" See znfra notes 15-36 and accompanying text.
1997-98]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
employees.' Part III will examine a different approach taken by
Massachusetts.'3 Finally, Part IV will compare Kentucky's approach to
the issue of temporary employees with that of Massachusetts, and will
endorse the latter.'4
I. THE TEMPORARY WORKFORCE PHENOMENON
A recent survey by The Conference Board, a New York-based global
research firm, reported that "the number of companies whose workforces
consist of at least 10 percent contingent workers grew from 12 percent in
1990 to 21 percent in 1995 and is expected to reach 35 percent by the
turn of the century ,15 As these findings suggest, the use of contingent
employment has substantially altered today's work environment; the
temporary employee is an integral part of this transformation.' 6 In fact,
the temporary employee population is by far "the fastest-growing
employment category" in the country '" Some commentators have gone
12 See infra notes 37-137 and accompanying text.
3 See mnfra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
'4 See infra notes 149-67 and accompanying text.
is Chris Mead, Temporary Employers: A New Breed For A New Century,
DETROrTER, May 1, 1996, at 17, available in 1996 WL 8800860.
16 For an in-depth survey of the demographics of this new employment
category, see Sharon R. Cohany, Workers in Alternative Employment Arrange-
ments, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 1, 1996, at 31, available in 1996 WL
10191296.
17 Dave Pelland, Risk Managers Chart Course for Success at West Coast
Conference, RISK MGMT., Nov 1, 1995, at 59, available in 1995 WL 12528410
(discussing the effects of temporary employment on risk management). The
demand for temporary workers has not been confined to the United States. See
Temsha Mercer, Temp Firm, Perm Plans, CRAINS DET. Bus., June 24, 1996, at
3, available in 1996 WL 8425673 (discussing the emerging international markets
for temporary employees). Temporary employment providers, such as Manpower
Services, Inc. and Kelly Services, Inc., have become significant players in the
international labor market. See id. ("Once serving local corporations, temporary-
staffing companies now rush to supply multinational corporations with workers
overseas."). Alfredo Maseli, Kelly's semor vice president and general manager
of international operations, claims that Kelly's strategy is to have a presence "in
all of the significant countries in Europe, South America and Asia." Id. In
November, 1996, one commentator considered Manpower "the leader in
globalization, with a brisk business in Europe and Asia and a world market share
of 15 percent." Laura McClure, It's Only Temporary: Temporary Work in the
New US. Economy, Multinational Monitor, Nov. 1996, at 14 ("According to
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so far as to suggest that this rise in temporary employment has changed
"[t]he face of the American workforce."' 8
In 1985, temporary employment agencies provided American
companies with approximately 500,000 workers.19 By 1995, this number
had grown tremendously, "mushroom[ing] to 2 million, or nearly 1.5
percent of the workforce of the United States."'2 In fact, according to
the National Association of Teiiporary Staffing Services ("NATSS"),
"[tiemporary employment increased almost 250 percent between the years
of 1982 and 1993 - 10 times faster than overall employment growth."'"
Revenues experienced by the top labor brokers reflect this explosion
m demand for temporary labor.' Between 1991 and 1994, the tempo-
rary employment industry's "overall payroll rose 47 7 percent" and
"revenues grew 58.1 percent according to trade figures."'23 Accord-
mg to NATSS, the temporary employment industry "brought in nearly
$40 billion in 1995 with $28 billion going to workers' payroll."24
Manpower Executive Vice President James Fromsten, over half the agency's
workers and half its sales are overseas. Kelly Services, too, is global.").
18 Jenero & Spognardi, supra note 10, at 127 (discussing the growing trend
of temporary employment).
19 See Jenero & Spognardi, supra note 10, at 127
20 Id. (citing Barbara J. Feder, Bigger Roles for Suppliers of Temporary
Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1995, 1, at 37); see also Mead, supra note 15
(citing a study done by Heidi Hartman, director of the Washington-based
nonprofit Institute for Women's Policy Research, and stating that "in 1990, more
than 19 million workers, or 16 percent of the total workforce, held contingent
jobs"); James Aley, The Temp Biz Boom: Why It's Good, FORTUNE, Oct. 16,
1995, at 53, 55 ("There are currently between 5,000 and 6,000 temporary
compames in the U.S., according to [National Association of Temporary
Services]; ten years ago there were half as many.").
21 McClure, supra note 17, at 14 (discussing the advantages and disadvantag-
es of temporary employment).
2 See Ray Tuttle, Temporary Trend: Companies Using Temporary Firms To
Ease Changes, Find Workers, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 22, 1996, at El, available
in 1996 WL 2038843 (noting that "[iun 1995, the nation's temporary businesses
grew 12.9 percent from the previous year Revenues topped a record 39.2
billion and payroll rose an identical 12.9 percent to 27.9 billion.").
23 Id.
24 Thomas Goetz, Look For the Union Label: In the Effort to Organize
Temp Workers, Business Doesn't See the Benefits, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 21,
1997, at 38, 39; see also McClure, supra note 17, at 14 ("According to the
National Association of Temporary Staffing Services (NATSS), the temporary
help industry's receipts rose almost 13 percent last year, to a record high of
1997-98]
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In addition to ever-increasing numbers of temporary employees,
temporary agencies have been providing temporary employees to fill an
increasing variety of positions m the American workforce.' Although
clerical positions remain the mainstay of the temporary employment
industry, recently the professional and techmcal fields represented have
grown to include "chief financial officers, paralegals, and sales and
marketing reps."'26 Managers in today's marketplace can hire virtually
any kind of temporary employee, including attorneys27 and physi-
cians. 2
8
The popularity of temporary employees can be attributed to a variety
of factors.29 For example, "[corporate] downsizing, increased global
$39.2 billion."); Mercer, supra note 17, at 3 (stating that Kelly Services "posted
1995 net earnings of $69.5 million, a 14 percent increase on earnings of $61.1
million in 1994':).
25 See Wiley, supra note 1. Carolyn Wiley writes:
According to a survey of temporary workers, office/clencals represent
43.1 percent of the 1993 payroll. Industrial workers or the blue-collar
segment make up 30.4 percent. The technical segment represents 12
percent of payroll. Professionals represent 5.2 percent. Medicals (e.g.,
RNs, and medical technologists) constitute 6 percent of the payroll.
Marketing, including demonstrators and telemarketingpersonnel, is 1.1
percent of payroll, and other categories of temporary employees
represent 2.6 percent of the total industry payroll.
Id. See generally Lewis M. Segal & Daniel G. Sullivan, The Temporary Labor
Force, ECON. PERSP., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 2 (stating that the demographcs of the
temporary workforce are expanding); Jeffrey L. Hiday, As Temp Employment
Sector Changes, Workers Get Higher Pay, More Benefits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8,
1996, at B5C.
26 Wiley, supra note 1, see also Mead, supra note 15, at 17 (quoting Jeanne
Helter, executivevice-president and co-owner of Manpower of Detroit, as saying:
"'Positions which require a bachelor's degree or some post-secondary degree are
going to increase."').
27 See Wiley, supra note 1 (According to Pat Taylor, who runs a temporary
agency in Washington, D.C., supplying temporary attorneys has become a
"significant chunk" of her business. Taylor says that the traditional method of
recruiting, i.e., summer internshps for law students, is expensive. Her law firm
clients find that hiring a temporary attorney is a less expensive recruiting
method.); see also Aley, supra note 20, at 53; Larry Smith, Temp Lawyers Enter
Next Phase as Corporate Giants Acquire Agencies Nationwide, OF COUNSEL,
Jan. 15, 1996, at 1 (discussing the increasing use of temporary attorneys by
employers).
28 See Wiley, supra note 1.
29See generally Richard R. Carlson, Variations on a Theme ofEmployment:
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competition, [and] technology" have played a significant role in the
growth of this new industry30 Moreover, "the need to respond quickly
to an ever-changing market place" motivates employers to seek the
services of temporary employment agencies." Finally, "[o]ne of the
traditional attractions for using contingent workers has been the savings
associated with providing few, if any, benefits."'32 To this end, the
enormous influx of temporary employees into the American workforce is
partly a result of employers who "do not want to be saddled with the
high fixed costs and management tasks associated with full-time
employees, including medical insurance, disability insurance, social
security taxes, workers' compensation benefits, recruiting, training, career
development costs and so on."'3 Rather, "[t]he tasks of recruiting, filling
job assignments, training, paying a salary, and providing fringe benefits,
Labor Law Regulation ofAlternative WorkerRelations, 37 S. TEX. L. REV 661,
688 (1996).
30 See Wiley, supra note 1 (stating, in discussing the increasing use of
temporary employees by American companies, that "[j]ust as the industrial
revolution changed the very fabric of our society, the technological explosion [of
the twentieth century] is transforming the U.S. Workplace."); see also Mead,
supra note 15 ("Powerful market forces like corporate downsizing and
outsourcing, harnessed to changes in personal lifestyles, continue to create a new
breed of temporary workers. They've got the skills to command top pay and
they're willing to work outside the traditional job structure.").
3' Wiley, supra note 1.
32 Phaedra Brotherton, Staff to Suit (Temporary Employees), HR MAG.,
Friday, Dec. 1, 1995, at 50, 54 (discussing how employers "are beginning to use
temporary employees not only to fill in gaps, but also in strategic ways that give
them the fluidity to meet their fluctuating business needs").
" Donald J. McNerney, Human Resource Management: Are Contingent
Workers Really Cheaper?, HUM. RESOURCE FocUs, Sept. 1, 1995, at 1, 6,
available in 1995 WL 8567771; see id. at 6 (stating that according to John H.
Zimmerman, chief human resources officer, MCI Communications Corp.,
companies want "more flexibility with less obligation," and that companies are
looking to reduce labor costs by leasing temps when demand is high and letting
them go when demand is low); see also Brotherton, supra note 32, at 50
("[E]mployers [can] more quickly adapt to fluctuating business cycles and
provide better employment stability for their core workforce" by leasing
temporary employees from temporary agencies); see generally Segal & Sullivan,
supra note 25, at 7 (noting several reasons that employers are attracted to
contingent workers, including lower wages, increased flexibility, maintenance of




including retirement," become the responsibility of the temporary
agency
34
Because thls new employment relationship created by the temporary
agency, recipient company, and temporary worker skews many of the
concepts fundamental to employment law, its effect on states' workers'
compensation laws has been widespread. 5 While most states are in
general agreement on how to analyze the status of a temporary worker m
the context of workers' compensation, 6 no bright lines have yet been
drawn. An examination of Kentucky's handling of tis tripartite
relationship reveals that its analysis is quite typical.
II. KENTUCKY'S JuDIcIAL TREATMENT OF TEMPORARY
EMPLOYEES IN THE CONTEXT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A. M.J. Daly Co. v Varney3"
In MJ. Daly Co. v. Varney ('M.J. Daly"), a chemical distributing
plant in Ludlow, Kentucky, entered into a contract with Personnel Pool
of Northern Kentucky, Inc. ("Personnel Pool"), a temporary employment
agency, providing that the agency would lease a temporary worker to
M.J. Daly 3 Varney, an employee of Personnel Pool, was selected for
the assignment,39 and was injured while working at the chemical plant.
After collecting Ins workers' compensation benefits from Personnel Pool,
Varney brought a tort action against M.J. Daly alleging that the company
was negligent and therefore responsible for his injuries.40
Writing for the majority, Justice Leibson clearly defined the issue
presented: "The question is whether M.J. Daly Co. can claim statutory
immunity based on the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers'
Compensation Act4' by qualifying as either an 'employer' or as a
4 See Wiley, supra note 1.
3 See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
31 M.J. Daly Co. v. Varney, 695 S.W.2d 400 (Ky. 1985).
31 See id. at 401.
39 See id. It is not clear from the court's opinion whether Varney was
personally selected by M.J. Daly or if he was simply chosen by Personnel Pool
for the assignment.
40 See id.
41 KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 342.690 (Micie 1997). This statute provides that
if the employee has elected to be covered by workers' compensation, he is said
to have surrendered his right to sue his employer for Ins work-related injuries,
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'contractor' within the definition of those terms as used m the Act."'42
The court then attempted to place M.J. Daly into one of these two
categories.43
After dismssmg the suggestion that M.J. Daly be labeled a "contrac-
tor" for purposes of workers' compensation,' the court focused on
whether M.J. Daly could be considered Varney's "employer."45 The
court relied heavily upon Professor Larson's treatise on workers'
compensation and made use of Larson's "three prong test for the
determination of when an employee is a loaned servant of another
employer for purposes of workers' compensation coverage ,,46 This
test requires affirmative findings with regard to all three factors before
the necessary employment relationship will be found.47 These factors
are:
(a) the employee has made a contract of hire, expressed or implied,
with the special employer,
and workers' compensation becomes his exclusive remedy. See id. The exclusive
remedyprovisions therefore allow the employeeto collectworkers' compensation
benefits under a no-fault scheme of recovery, even though the right to sue has
been forfeited. See 6 ARTHUR LARsON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAW § 65.11, at 12-1 (1997). Similarly, while the employer
subjects himself to the workers' compensation no-fault scheme, he takes
advantage of immunity from common law actions. See id. The purpose of this
process is to facilitate quick recoveries for mjured employees. See Searcy v.
Three Point Coal Co., 134 S.W.2d 228 (Ky. 1939).
42 Varney, 695 S.W.2d at 401.
41 See Zd. at 401-03.
44 See id. at 401. The court relied on Bright v. Reynolds Metals Co., 490
S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1973). Justice Leibson wrote that the term "contractor," as used
in KR.S. § 342.610(2), "is limited to its 'common usage,' meaning the situation
where a "'principal contractor" engages subcontractors to assist in the perfor-
mance of the work or the completion of the project which the "prncipal
contractor" has undertakento performfor another "' Varney, 695 S.W.2d at 401
(quoting Bright, 490 S.W.2d at 476). Because M.J. Daly had contracted with
Personnel Pool for a person to do work for M.J. Daly and not "for another," the
court rejected the idea that M.J. Daly could be a "contractor." See id. The
definition of "contractor"under K.R.S. § 342.610(2) was broadenedby the court
one year later. See infra notes 66-98 and accompanying text.
41 See Varney, 695 S.W.2d at 401-03.




(b) the work being done is essentially that of the special employer;
and
(c) the special employer has the right to control the details of the
work.48
Although the work being done was clearly that of the special
employer and M.J. Daly had the requisite control over the work,49 the
court ruled that upon the facts presented, there was no contract of hire
between M.J. Daly and Varney 5" Consequently, Justice Leibson
concluded that M.J. Daly was not Varney's "employer," and therefore
Varney had retained his right to sue m tort.51
The court's inability to find a contract of hire between M.J. Daly and
Varney was compelled by an examination of the contract between
Personnel Pool and M.J. Daly as well as Varney's express refusal of M.J.
Daly's offers of a more permanent position. The contract between M.J.
Daly and Personnel Pobl "expressly provided that Personnel Pool would
be responsible for workers' compensation for employees firmshed to M.J.
Daly Co."'52 Since responsibility for workers' compensation is typically
48 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 41, § 48.00, at 8-434.
49 As to the last two factors, the Varney court stated that "[i]t is clear that
the work being done here was essentially that of the special employer and that
the special employer had the right to control the details of the work." Varney,
695 S.W.2d at 402. While most courts find that temporary employees do the
work of the special employer and are essentially controlled-by the special
employer, not all courts give such cursory treatment to these important factors
when analyzing the employment status of temporary employees. See, e.g., Vigil
v. Digital Equip. Corp., 925 P.2d 883 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 923 P.2d
1164 (N.M. 1996) (discussing the control andwork-of-special-employerfactors);
Danels v Pamida, Inc., 561 N.W.2d 568 (Neb. 1997) (containing a limited
discussion of the control and work-of-special-employer factors).
50 Varney, 695 S.W.2d at 402. It is clear from his treatise that Professor
Larson regards the "contract of hire" factor as the most important of the three.
See 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 41, § 48.12, at 8-440 ("[C]ourts have
usually been vigilant in insisting upon a showing of a deliberate and informed
consent by the employee before employment relation will be held a bar to
common-law suit." This vigilance is due to the significance of such a finding.
"[T]he employee loses certain rights along with those he gains when he strikes
up a new employment relation. Most important of all, he loses the right to sue
the special employer at common law "). The requirement of a contract of
hire is statutorily mandatedin Kentucky. See K.R.S. § 342.640(1) (Michie 1997).
"' See Varney, 695 S.W.2d at 403.52 id.
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assumed by the employer, the court found that by including this provision
in the contract, Personnel Pool had in fact assumed the role of employer.
Justice Leibson observed that "where the intent of the parties involved is
expressed through such [a] contractual relationship[ ], the parties have
fixed their status and we recognize their nght to do so."' Moreover, the
court noted that the right of parties to contract as they wish should be
recognized in a "free enterprise system."' 4
The court also found that M.J. Daly, before the explosion, had
offered Varney employment but that Varney had expressly refused the
offer and instead elected to remain an employee of Personnel Pool.55
Because of the voluntary nature of both the employment relationship and
workers' compensation coverage itself, significant weight was afforded
this agreement.5 6 Since Varney expressly refused employment with M.J.
Daly, the availability of workers' compensation never arose, and therefore
Varney had retained his right to sue M.J. Daly under common law. The
court opined that like the contract between M.J. Daly and Personnel Pool,
Varney's rejection of permanent employment "should be recognized." 7
Again citing Professor Larson, the court observed, "'Workers and
employers must be allowed to make any arrangement they choose, and,
if a worker prefers to be without compensation protection rather than
an employee with compensation protection, that is Ins privilege."'5,
Furthermore, "paternalism should not be carned so far that the state says
to [a worker], 'We do not care what you want; we think employee status
with compensation protection is better for you.' 5 9
However, the court placed a caveat at the end of its decision noting
that "[t]he burden for common law liability on [M.J. Daly was] not
as significant as might appear at first blush."6 Justice Leibson reassured
53 Id.
54Id.
51 See id. at 401.
56 See 1 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 41, at 8-307; see also 3 Id. § 47.10,
at 8-301 ("To thrust upon a worker an employee status to winch he has never
consented. might well deprive him of valuable rights under the compensation
act, notably the right to sue his employer for common law damages.").
-7 Varney, 695 S.W.2d at 403. But see infra notes 99-124 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Joseph T. Griffin Co. v Florence, No. 95-CA-0394-MR,
slip op. (Ky. Ct. App. July 5, 1996).
51 Varney, 695 S.W.2d at 402 (quoting 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 41,
§ 46.10, at 8-200).
51 Id. (quoting 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 41, § 46.30, at 8-216).60 Id. at 403.
1997-98]
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M.J. Daly that not only did its exposure to common law liability rest on
a fault-based system, but that just as a recipient company may contract
away its responsibilities as an employer, the company could contractually
"require indemnification for any liability in tort that might occur by
reason of utilizing the services of such a company 61 'The bottom
line," noted the court, "is that the parties are free to contract as they
wish[,]" and "[w]e are obliged to accept the status which they have
expressed for themselves."'62
B. Hawkins v Techmcal Minerals, Inc. 3
The factual scenario in Hawlans v. Technical Minerals, Inc. is
essentially the same as that found in Varney. Hawkins was an employee
of Omm Personnel ("Omni"), a labor service company Pursuant to a
contract between Omm and Techmcal Minerals ("TM'), Hawkins was
assigned to work for TM. Hawkins suffered an injury to his hand while
cleaning one of TM's chenmcal mixers.' In an eight-to-six decision, the
court ruled that TM was Omni's contractor and therefore, pursuant to
K.R.S. § 342.610(2)(b) and K.R.S. § 342.690, Hawkins was barred from
bringing a negligence suit against TM.
Similarly to the- situation in Varney, Hawkins was paid workers'
compensation by Omni's carrier and then filed a suit against TM alleging
that its negligence was the cause of his inJUries.65 Rather than applying
the loaned employee test that was used in Varney, the court of appeals
based its decision on the language of K.R.S. § 342.610(2)(b), the statute
that defines the term "contractor." Judge Combs, writing for the majority,
narrowed the issue to the following: "the status of TM vis-a-vis Omm -
i.e., whether TM was a contractor for purposes of the workers' compen-
sation statute."6
6
The court then directed its attention to K.R.S. § 342.610(2), which
reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Hawkins v Technical Minerals, Inc., No. 93-CA-1958-MP, 1995 WL
680034 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1995), aJfd sub nom. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Technical Minerals, Inc., 934 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1996).
6See id.
65 See id. at *2-3.
66 Id. at *2.
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A contractor who subcontracts all or any part of a contract and his
carrier shall be liable for the payment of compensation to the employees
of the subcontractor unless the subcontractor primarily liable for the
payment of such compensation has secured the payment of compensa-
tion as provided for in this chapter. A person who contracts with
another (b) To have work performed of a kind which is a regular
or recurrent part of the work of the trade, business, occupation or
profession of such person shall for the purposes of this section be
deemed a contractor, and such other person a subcontractor. 7
It was undisputed that TM and Omm had contracted to have work
performed for TM by Hawkins. In addition, the court found that "[t]he
work performed was a regular and recurring part of TM's business." 8
Consequently, the court concluded that "under the clear statutory
definition, TM [was] a 'contractor' within the meaning of the Kentucky
Workers' Compensation Act and Omm [was] a 'subcontractor.' 69
The court next directed its attention to the language of K.R.S. §
342.690(1), the exclusive remedy provision of Kentucky's Workers'
Compensation Act. That statute provides in pertinent part:
If an employer secures payment of compensation as required by this
chapter, the liability of such employer under this chapter shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the
employee For purposes of this section, the term "employer" shall
include a "contractor" covered by subsection (2) of KRS 342.610,
whether or not the subcontractor has in fact, secured the payment of
compensation.7"
The court opmed that since TM met the statutory definition of "contrac-
tor" provided in K.R.S. § 342.690, TM could claim immunity from
common law suits by Omni's employees.7 Moreover, not only was TM
immune from a negligence action by Hawkins, but because Omm had
properly secured workers' compensation coverage for Hawkins, TM was
67 K.R.S. § 342.610(2) (Michie 1997).
68 Haw/ans, 1995 WL 680034, at *3.
69 Id.
70 IKS. § 342.690(1) (Miche 1997).
7' Haw/ans, 1995 WL 680034, at *4.
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not liable for any additional workers' compensation payments.72 As a
result, TM's motion for summary judgment was granted."
In arguing TM was not a "contractor" under K.R.S. § 342.610(2)(b),
'Hawkins relied on the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Varney.
Hawkins urged that the Varney court, ruling upon facts almost identical
to the facts at hand, had found that the recipient company, M.J. Daly,
was not a "contractor" within the meaning of the Act.74 Hawkins argued
that the Varney court, relying on Bright v. Reynolds Metals Co., 75 ruled
that the term "contractor" "is limited to its 'common usage,' meaning the
situation where a "'principal contractor" engages subcontractors to assist
in the performance of the work or the completion of the project which the
"principal contractor" has undertaken to perform for another."' 76
Because he was doing work for TM and not "for another," Hawkins
argued that TM could not successfully define itself as a "contractor"
under K.R.S. § 342.610(2). 77
The court rejected Hawkins' argument. Rather, it found that the
Varney court's definition of "contractor" was incorrect because it
indirectly relied on a repealed statute. The court explained that on
January 1, 1973, more than ten years before the decision in Varney, "'the
statutory scheme under which Bright v. Reynolds Metals Co. was decided
was repealed effective January 1, 1973.' ,78 The Hawlans court further
stated that "[d]isregarding [this] specific change in the statutory language
and the definition of 'contractor' found in KRS § 342.610(2), the court
72 See id.
73 See zd. at *7
74 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
7 Bright v. Reynolds Metals Co., 490 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1973).
76 M.J. Daly Company v. Varney, 695 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Ky. 1985) (quoting
Brght, 490 S.W.2d at 474).
77 See Hawlans, 1995 WL 680034, at *5.7 1 Id. (quoting the trial court's opinion). The court's decision m Brnght was
governed by K.R.S. § 342.060, which provided in pertinent part:
A principal contractor, intermediate or subcontractor shall be liable for
compensation to any employee injured while in the employ of any one
of his intermediate or subcontractors and engaged upon the subject
matter of the contract, to the same extent as the immediate employer
This section shall apply only in cases where the injury occurred
on, in or about the premises on which the principal contractor has
undertaken to execute work or which are under hIs control otherwise or
management.
K.R.S. § 342.060 (Michie 1997).
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in [Varney] continued to define the term on the basis of common law
principles."'79
The Haw/ans court then explained that this discrepancy m the
definition of "contractor" was remedied by the court one year after the
Varney decision m Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Sherman &
Fletcher 0""1 In Sherman & Fletcher, the court "concluded that the
definition of 'contractor' m KRS § 342.610(2) was broad enough to
encompass far more than the limited definition found m [Varney]."82
Justice Vance, writing for the majority in Sherman & Fletcher, observed:
Following the decision m Bright v. Reynolds Metals Co., the
General Assembly enacted KRS 342.610 in its present form which
provides that a person who contracts with another to do work of a kind
which is a recurrent part of the work of the trade or occupation of such
person shall be deemed a contractor. We construe this to mean that a
person who engages another to perform a part of the work which is a
recurrent part of his business, trade, or occupation is a contractor. Even
though he may never perform that particularjob with his own employ-
ees, he is still a contractor if the job is usually a regular or recurrent
part of his trade or occupation.83
Tins new statutory scheme moved the focus of the "contractor" analysis
from who was the beneficiary of the work to what kind of work was
being done. With this in mind, Judge Combs concluded that in light of
TM's contract with Omni, whereby Hawkins would perform work that
was a recurrent part of TM's business, TM was a "contractor" and Omm
79 Hawkins, 1995 WL 680034, at *5.
80 Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sherman & Fletcher, 705 S.W.2d 459 (Ky.
1986).
8 See Hawlans, 1995 WL 680034, at *5.
82 Id.
" Sherman & Fletcher, 705 S.W.2d at 462. But see id. at 467 (Leibson, J.,
dissenting). Judge Leibson wrote:
[T]he statutory language was not reworked in 1972 to overrule
Bright. If anything, the statutory changes effected in 1972 reinforced
Bright. Dropping the word "principal" from the Section of the Act
specifying that a "contractor"may be liable for workers' compensation,
reenforces [sic] Bright because, if anything, an owner/builder falls more
readily under the term "principal contractor" than under the term
"contractor." The term "contractor" quite obviously refers to a general
contractor who contracts with the owner to build the project for him.
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was a "subcontractor" under K.R.S. § 342.610(2).14 Consequently,
because TM still earned responsibility for paying Hawkins' workers'
compensation benefits in the event that Omm was not adequately
covered,"5 TM was entitled to the quid pro quo of immunity from
common law tort action by Hawkins.
Judge Gudgel, joined by five other judges, drafted the dissenting
opinion in Hawlans. Rather than return to the "employer/employee"
approach espoused in Varney, Judge Gudgel based his decision on the
same statutory language (K.R.S. § 342.610(2)) relied upon by the
majority The dissent focused heavily on the court's decisions in Sherman
& Fletcher and Varney. In Sherman & Fletcher, David George was an
employee of a fiaming subcontractor who agreed to perform some
framing carpentry for Sherman & Fletcher, owners and developers of a
town house construction project.86 While George was working on the
project, he was killed when a concrete block wall at the construction site
collapsed. 7 George's estate received workers' compensation benefits
from Elder, Inc. and pursued a negligence action against Sherman &
Fletcher."8
The court found that Sherman & Fletcher bore no liability because
pursuant to K.R.S. § 342.610(2), Sherman & Fletcher had contracted with
Elder, Inc. to have work performed that was a "regular or recurrent part
of the work of the business of building construction."89 Commenting on
the court's decision in Sherman & Fletcher, Judge Gudgel observed:
The court emphasized. that the present statute [K.RS. § 34.610(2)]
requires that before an alleged statutory employer may come within the
purview of the statute, that party must either contract with or engage
another to do work of a land which is a regular or recurrent part of the
alleged statutory employer's trade or occupation. The focus of the
84 See Hawians, 1995 WL 680034, at *6.
85 See id. Pursuant to K.R.S. § 342.700(2), popularly known as the "up-the-
ladder statute," if the subcontractor, which is primarily responsible for workers'
compensation coverage, fails to provide adequate coverage, the responsibility
goes "up the ladder" to the principal contractor. See Sherman & Fletcher, 705
S.W.2d at 466. The Haw/ans court explained that "TM would have been
liable for workers' compensationbenefits to Hawkins if Omm, his employer, had
not already secured those benefits." Hawains, 1995 WL 680034, at *6.
86 See Sherman & Fletcher, 705 S.W.2d at 460.
87 See Id.
88 See id.
89 Id. at 462.
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statute, therefore, is on the contract between the alleged statutory
employer and the injured worker's employer, rather than upon the
relationship between the alleged statutory employer and the injured
worker.
90
Judge Gudgel endorsed the decision reached by the court in Sherman &
Fletcher because its focus was on the contract between Sherman &
Fletcher and Elder, Inc.9 1 That contract was for the performance of work
that was a regular or recurrent part of Sherman & Fletcher's business,
i.e., fiamng carpentry, and therefore made Sherman & Fletcher a
"contractor" as defined by K.R.S. § 342.610(2).
On the other hand, Judge Gudgel noted that the court in Varney
seemed to have taken "an arguably contradictory" approach by focusing
more on any contract between M.J. Daly (alleged statutory employer) and
Varney (injured worker) rather than on the contract that existed between
M.J. Daly, the general employer, and Personnel Pool, the recipient
company 92 Notwithstanding this discrepancy, Judge Gudgel was
convinced that the court's decision in Varney was appropriate because the
contract between M.J. Daly and Personnel Pool simply provided for a
worker's general services. Unlike the contract between Sherman &
Fletcher and Elder, Inc., M.J. Daly did not contract with Personnel Pool
for work that was a regular or recurrent part of M.J. Daly's business or
occupation.93 In other words, general labor was not a "regular or
recurrent part" of M.J. Daly's business.94 Consequently, "because [M.J.]
Daly's contract with the labor services company did not involve an
agreement by which the labor services company would perform work of
a land which was a regular or recurrent part of M.J. Daly's business, the
90Haw/ans, 1995 WL 680034, at *14 (Gudgel, J., dissenting).
91 Although Judge Gudgel advocated scrutiny of the contract between the
general employer and the special employer, most jurisdictions have held that the
focus should be on the employee. See 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 41, §
47.10, at 8-301 (stating that in master-servant cases the analysis should focus on
the two employers because the employee does not stand to lose any significant
rights. However, in compensation cases, the focus is properly on the employee
because Ins rights to sue could be jeopardized. It is precisely this which
necessitates a finding of a contract of hre between the "special employer" and
the employee.).
92 Hawkns, 1995 WL 680034, at *14 (Gudgel, J., dissenting).




court correctly concluded that [M.J.] Daly was not the worker's statutory
employer."95
Finally, Judge Gudgel turned his attention to the present dispute
among TM, Omm, and Hawkins. Recognizing that TM had never claimed
to be Hawkins' "actual employer for purposes of the workers' compensa-
tion act," the analysis rested solely on the question of whether TM could
be considered Hawkins' "statutory employer pursuant to KRS
342.610(2).,, 96 Judge Gudgel drew a distinct parallel between TM's
status and the status of M.J. Daly Focusing on the contract between TM
and Omni, Judge Gudgel noted that TM contracted with Omm for "a
worker who would assist TM in performing various duties 9M The
contract with Omm did not provided for Omni's "performance,
supervision or control of work of a kind which was a regular or
recurrent part of TM's trade or busmess."98 Because of the nature of the
contractual relationship between the parties, Judge Gudgel concluded that
TM could not take advantage of either the contractor status provided in
K.R.S. § 342.610(2) or the accompanying immunity from common law
suit.
C. Joseph T. Griffin Co. v Florence99
Joseph T. Griffin Co. v. Florence was decided in 1996 by the
Kentucky Court of Appeals and, as in most cases on this issue, its basic
facts are typical. Joseph T. Griffin Company ("Griffin") obtained the
services of Florence from Career Connection, a temporary labor provider.
While working for Griffin, Florence was injured. Thereafter, Florence
received workers' compensation' payments from Career Connection and
brought suit against Griffin for negligence."' °
Rather than follow the court's statutory analysis in Hawlans, the
Florence court focused upon the question of whether or not Florence
could be considered Griffin's employee. Following Varney, the court
applied Professor Larson's loaned employee test and concluded that
Griffin was Florence's special employer for purposes of workers'
95 Id.
96 Id. at *17
97 Id.
98 Id.
9' Joseph T. Griffin Co. v. Florence, No. 95-CA-0394-MR, slip op. (Ky. Ct.
App. July 5, 1996). This decision is not final and shall not be cited as authority
in any courts of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
10 See id. at 10
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compensation." ' As a result, the court ruled that Griffin could claimimmunity from Florence's suit for negligence." 2 As in Varney, it was
undisputed that "Florence was performing the work of [the recipient
company] when he was injured, that [the recipient company] had the right
to control the details of Florence's work, and that Florence had no
express contract of hire with [the recipient company]." ' 3 Therefore, the
determinative question was whether an implied contract of hire existed
between Florence and Griffin.
Writing for the court, Chief Judge Wilhoit considered the inherent
structure of the temporary employment agency itself in concluding that
Florence had, in fact, entered into an implied contract of employment
with Griffin.' Like Justice Leibson in Varney, Judge Wilhoit relied on
the voluntariness of the parties' entry into a working relationship. ' 5
However, while Justice Leibson hung his voluntanness hat on Varney's
express refusal to become an M.J. Daly employee, Judge Wilhoit's
situation was a little more difficult. Unlike Varney, Florence was never
expressly offered a position with the recipient company; therefore, he
never expressly stated to anyone what his employment intentions were.
In gauging whether Hawkins voluntarily entered into an employment
contract with Griffin, Judge Wilhoit had to rely solely on Hawkins'
actions. 0 6 The judge observed that "[Florence] had the choice to accept
or decline the employment after being told of the job's require-
ments."'0 7 In addition, it was Florence himself who "assented to
perform the work for Joseph Griffin Company [and] [t]he company,
in turn, assented to [Florence's] doing so.' 0 8
Ultimately, the court ruled that "through Florence's voluntary choice
of working for and accepting the control of Joseph Griffin Company, and
its accepting hun to do the work, an implied contract of hire between him
and the company existed."'0 9 Because Judge Wilhoit found Griffin to
101 See id.
,02 See Florence, No. 95-CA-0394-MR, at 10.





"' Id. Notice that unlike Judge Gudgel's approach, Judge Wilhoit focused on
the relationship between Florence, the employee, and Griffin, the alleged
employer.
" Id. One inherent aspect of temporary employment through a temporary
agency such as Career Connection is that the temporary employee receives his
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be Florence's employer for purposes of workers' compensation, and thus
immune from Florence's common law suit, the court declined "to address
whether [Griffin] qualiffied] for tort immunity based on the 'contractor-
under' statute [K.R.S. § 342.610(2)].11n
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Knopf disagreed that an implied
contract for hire existed between the parties."' Although he agreed with
Judge Wilhoit that it is proper for the court to find an implied contract
of hire through an examination of the facts of a case, Judge Knopf
explained that such a contract must still "contain all of the elementary
ingredients of a written contract."1 2 According to Judge Knopf,
Florence and Griffin never "intended to enter into a contract with one
another [and as such, they never had a] meeting of the minds.1 13
Harkening back to Professor Larson's warning concerning the dangers of
allowing unsuspecting individuals to have an employment status thrust
upon them, Judge Knopf articulated the query as whether Florence
intended to contract with Griffin Company to become its employee for
workers' compensation purposes.114
Analyzing the same "unique circumstances [inherent in] labor service
companies"1 5 that Judge Wilhoit had focused on in finding an implied
contract of hire, Judge Knopf amved at the opposite conclusion - that
no contract of hire existed as between Florence and Griffin." 6 The
judge observed:
payment directly from the temporary agency. The court disregarded this fact in
its finding that Florence's wages were indirectly paid by Griffin via its payments
to Career Connection. See id.110 Id.
n See id. (Knopf, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 12 (Knopf, J., dissenting).
.. Id. (Knopf, J., dissenting).
14 See id. (Knopf, J., dissenting); 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 41, §
48.30, at 8-434.
115 Florence, No. 95-CA-0394-MR, at 12-13.
116 See id. Judge Knopf did not focus on whether Griffin intended to contract
with Florence, but rather on whether Florence intended to contract with Griffin.
This analysis corresponds with Professor Larson's writings on the subject. Larson
suggests that "[i]n compensation law, the spotlight must now be turned upon the
employee, for the first question of all is: Did he make a contract of hire with the
[alleged] special employer?" 3 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 41, § 48.11, at
8-440. The focus on the employee is a result of the rights that he gives up if a
contract of hire is found. See supra note 41.
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Florence did not negotiate with Joseph Griffin Co. for employment.
Although Florence did agree to do work that the Joseph Griffin Co.
needed, this obligation was made to Career Connection in response to
his contract with Career Connection. Florence did not meet with the
Joseph Griffin Co. until he had already obligated himself to do the
work. Career Connection then instructed Florence as to where and when
to make ns first contact with the Joseph Griffin Co. Florence was paid
by Career Connection and, after Florence had completed the temporary
work for the Joseph Griffin Co., Florence would have continued to
work for Career Connection and looked to Career Connection for future
job assignments." 7
In addition, Judge Knopf pointed out that the labor service provider
"'d[id] all the payroll paper work, and mamtam[ed] the benefits for
[Florence].' 32118
Furthermore, Judge Knopf asked why any worker would elect to be
"covered by two (2) workers' compensation insurance policies, one
provided by the labor service company and one provided by the client
when the worker can only recover under one (1) policy9"'" 9 He
opined that a well informed worker would never give up his "constitu-
tional rights to be compensated for another's negligence" for the
opportunity to be doubly covered under workers' compensation. 0 This
is especially true when the worker gives up his right to be compensated
from the very "employer" who is the most likely to cause his injury
Judge Knopf urged that when presented with such choices, Florence
surely would have elected to be covered by Career Connection's workers'
compensation insurance policy and retain his right to sue Griffin, since
it was Griffin, not Career Connection, that was in the best position to
protect Florence from a work-related injury' 2 1
The dissent proceeded to reject the majority's decision that this case
differed from Varney in that Florence never expressly refused employ-
ment status with Griffin." The fallacy in such an argument, noted
Judge Knopf, is that rather than focusing on the "employee," the
"' Florence, No. 95-CA-0394-MR, at 12-13.
"




" See id. at 14.
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majority's analysis turns on the actions of the alleged special employer.
The significance of this fundamental difference is that "[tlhe offer of
permanent employment by a third party is beyond the employee's control.
Not every employee will have the chance, as Varney did, to turn down
the offer so that he will not be considered an employee of the compa-
ny"1 If the client company wants "to become the 'employer' for
purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act, then they must contract to
do so. Otherwise, the law should not imply that the contracts exist."' 24
D. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v Techmcal Minerals,
Inc.
125
The Kentucky Court of Appeals' holding in Hawkins v. Technical
Minerals, Inc. was reaffirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court in United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Technical Minerals, Inc.
("U.S.F.&G."). The court stated that "[t]he viability of Hawkins' tort
claim depends on whether the case of MJ. Daly Co. v. Varney was
overruled by implication in Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Sherman
& Fletcher ,126 The significance of those two cases, of course, was in
their interpretation of the term "contractor" as used in K.R.S. §
342.610(2).127 The court concluded that Varney was in fact implicitly
overruled by the decision in Sherman & Fletcher 28
The Kentucky Supreme Court's analysis in U.S.F.&G. closely
resembles that of the Court of Appeals in Hawkins. Techmcal Minerals
("TMr"), the U.S.F.&G. court noted, "contracted to have work performed
by a contract employee. The work performed was a regular and recurring
part of TMI's business. Therefore, under the clear statutory definition,
TMI is a 'contractor' within the meaning of the Kentucky Workers'
Compensation Act and the contract labor company is a 'subcontrac-
tor.' "129 At the end of its opinion, the court recognized that a contrary
conclusion would have the effect of "destroy[ing] the temporary services
23 Id. at 7
124 See id. at 15.
125 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Technical Minerals, Inc., 934
S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1996).
126 Id. at 267
127 See supra notes 44, 74-85.




industry "130 The court, concerned with providing a wmdfall for tempo-
rary employees, added:
Historically, a major reason employers were willing to provide Workers'
Compensation benefits was to be free of common law civil liability. By
the argument of plaintiffs in this case, such would be totally frustrated
and the plaintiff would have the best of both worlds, Workers'
Compensation benefits and a common law right of action. By contrast,
the defendant/employer would have the worst of both worlds and this
could not have been legislative intent."'
Many states have been as reluctant as Kentucky to allow a temporary
worker to bring a common law suit against a recipient company 132 Like
Kentucky, most of these states have used Larson's loaned employee test
to determine whether or not a temporary employee had become an
employee of the recipient company and thus was barred from bringing a
common law suit against the recipient company 133 Because of the very
nature of the temporary employment structure, courts have not had much
difficulty in finding that the second and third prongs of the loaned
employee test are satisfied. In analyzing the first, and according to
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 For cases holding that a recipient company enjoys common law mimunity
from suits by temporary employees provided by temporary employment agencies,
see Keller v Evans Cooperage, Inc., 641 So. 2d 552 (5th Cir. 1994); Tweedy v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 882 F.2d 477 (11 th Cir. 1989); Honey v. United Parcel
Serv., 879 F Supp. 615 (S.D. Miss. 1995); Santa Cruz Poultry, Inc. v. Stier, 239
Cal. Rptr. 578 (Ct. App. 1987); Fletcher v. Apache Hose & Belting Co., 519
N.W.2d 839 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994); Whiteheadv Safway Steel Prods., 497 A.2d
803 (Md. 1985); Kidder v. Miller-Davis Co., 564 N.W.2d 872 (Mich. 1997);
Danels v Pamida, Inc., 561 N.W.2d 568 (Neb. 1997); Vigil v. Digital Equip.
Corp., 925 P.2d 883 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 923 P.2d 1164 (N.M. 1996);
Henderson v. Manpower of Guilford County, 319 S.E.2d 690 (N.C. Ct. App.
1984); Newman v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 673 N.E.2d 1301 (Ohio 1997);
Backnall v. Westwood Corp., 747 P.2d 412 (Or. Ct. App. 1987), affd, 764 P.2d
544 (Or. 1988); Sorenson v. Colibn Corp., 650 A.2d 125 (R.I. 1994); Goodman
v. Sioux Steel Co., 475 N.W.2d 563 (S.D. 1991); Meka v. Falk Corp., 306
N.W.2d 65 (Wis. 1981).
133 See, e.g., Henderson, 319 S.E.2d at 694; Vigil, 925 P.2d at 885; Daniels,
561 N.W.2d at 570. But see Honey, 879 F Supp. at 617 (applying the common
law concept of borrowed servant to temporary employment relationship); Kidder,
564 N.W.2d at 879 (applying an economic reality test).
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Professor Larson the most important, prong, courts have used an
approach similar to that used by Judge Wilhoit in Florence.'
Nevertheless, there are jurisdictions that no longer use the loaned
employee test when dealing with temporary employees. 3 ' A majority
of these states have adopted legislation that pertains to the temporary
employment relationship.3 6 As a result, there are statutes that provide
the recipient company with employer immumty as well as statutes that
allow a temporary employee to bring suit against the temporary employ-
ment agency' 37 An example of the latter comes from Massachusetts.
m. A LOOK TO MASSAC-USETrS
Through two statutes, Massachusetts has developed a clear approach
to handling workers' compensation exclusivity-of-remedy issue in the
temporary employment context. The Massachusetts Appeals Court, the
state's intermediate appellate court, examined both statutes in Lang v.
Lamothe Co. ' s Lang, an employee of Peakload Inc., a company
engaged in the business of providing employers with temporary workers,
was "lent" to the Lamothe Company ("Lamothe"). Although both
Pealdoad and Lamothe provided the plaintiff with workers' compensation
coverage, the contract between the two employers did not specifically
' See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
... For example, Michigan and Pennsylvania have both rejected Larson's
three-part test. See Kidder, 564 N.W.2d at 872 (utilizing an economic reality
test); Daily Exp. Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 406 A.2d 600,
601-02 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (setting forth a seven-part test based primarily
on control rather than consent).
136 The following states have specifically addressed this issue: California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
Wisconsin. See CAL. INS. CODE § 11663 (West 1997); CoLo. REv STAT. § 8-
41-303 (Bradford 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-292 (West 1997); HAW.
REv STAT. § 366-1 (1993); 820 ILL. COM. STAT. 305/1-(l)(a)(4) (West 1997);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 18 (Law Co-op. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-29-
2(6)(iii) (West 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.29 (West 1997). Elizabeth J.
Fullenkemp, Goodman v. Sioux Steel Co.. South Dakota Limits Temporary
Employees'Recoveryto Workers' Compensation, 38 S.D. L. REv 379,386 n.72
(1993).
' Only one state, Hawaii, allows suit against the recipient company or
special employer. See Fullenkemp, supra note 136.
138 Lang v Larnothe Co., 479 N.E.2d 208 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985).
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address the issue of overlapping coverage.139 After Lang was injured
while working on Lamothe's premises, he received workers' compensa-
tion benefits from Peakload. Subsequently, he brought a negligence suit
against Lamothe.
Lamothe argued that pursuant to chapter 152, section 15 of the
Massachusetts General Laws ("G.L. ch. 152 § 15"), it was immune from
suit by temporary employees. 4 The last sentence of this section reads
as follows:
Nothing in this section, or m section eighteen or twenty-four shall be
construed to bar an action at law for damages for personal injuries or
wrongful death by an employee against any person other than the
insured person employing such employee and liable for payment of the
compensation provided by tls chapter for the employee's persbnal
injury or wrongful death and said insured person's employees. 4 '
Lamothe, contending that it fell within the class of those protected by
G.L. ch. 152 § 15, argued that it had both employed Lang and, because
it had covered Lang through its workers' compensation carrer, was
"liable for payment of compensation" to Lang.142
The court rejected Lamothe's claim and instead "reasoned that
[for] an employer to be immune under [chapter 152] from an employee's
common law action, he must satisfy a two-part test: '(1) the employer
must be an insured person liable for the payment of compensation, and
(2) the employer must be the direct employer of the employee.' 143
The court ruled that Lamothe had failed to satisfy the first prong of
the above test. Interpreting G.L. ch. 152 § 15, the court reasoned that
"the only person who will be immune from an action at law is 'the
insured person employing such employee and liable for payment of the
[workers'] compensation [benefits]."" '  Therefore, the question
became: Was Lamothe liable for Lang's workers' compensation
payments? The court found its answer in chapter 152, section 18 of the
Massachusetts General Laws ("G.L. ch. 152 § 18").14
139 See id.
140 See id. at 209.
141 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 152, § 15 (West 1988).
142 Lang, 479 N.E.2d at 209.
143 Id. (quoting the trial court's decision).
'4 Id. (quoting the trial court's decision).
"i Chapter 152, section 18 of the Massachusetts General Laws reads in part:
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That statute provides that when the relationship involves a special
employer and a general employer, the general employer, absent an
agreement between the "employers" to the contrary, shall have the
responsibility of providing the employee with workers' compensation
coverage.'46 Recogmzmg that Pealdoad was Lang's general employer
and that Lamothe was Lang's special employer,'47 the court opined that
the "unambiguous" language of G.L. ch. 152 § 18 places the burden of
liability for the payment of workers' compensation on the general
employer - m this case, on Peakload."' Consequently, because
Lamothe bore no liability for providing the plaintiff with workers'
compensation coverage, G.L. ch. 152 § 15 did not clothe Lamothe with
statutory immunity from a common law suit by Lang.
IV A COMPARISON OF KENTUCKY'S
K.R.S. §§ 342.610(2) AND 342.690 WiTH
MASSACHUSETTS' G.L. CH. 152 §§ 15 AND 18
G.L. ch. 152 § 18 and K.R.S. § 342.610(2), 1'4 the Kentucky statute
used by the courts in Varney and Hawlans, produce results that are
similar m two respects. First, both statutes place workers' compensation
liability on one of the parties, the general employer in a general
employer/special employer setting (Massachusetts), or the subcontractor
In a contractor/subcontractor setting (Kentucky). Because temporary
agencies like Manpower are deemed to be general employers in Massa-
chusetts and subcontractors in Kentucky,"5 ' these two statutes have the
In any case where there shall exist with respect to an employee a
general employer and a special employer relationship, as between the
general employer and the special employer, the liability for thepayment
of compensation for the injury shall be borne by the general employer
or its insurer, and the special employer or its insurer shall be liable for
such payment if the parties have so agreed or if the general employer
shall not be an insured or insured person under this chapter.
MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 152, § 18 (1911) (as amended 1969) (Law. Co-op 1989)
(emphasis added).
146 See id.
" The parties conceded the existence of such a relationship. See Lang, 479
N.E.2d at 209. See Ramsey's Case, 360 N.E.2d 911 (1977) for a brief discussion
of special and general employers.
148 Lang, 479 N.E.2d at 209.
141 See text accompanying supra note 67 for the relevant text of this statute.
... See supra notes 125-31.
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same effect: they burden the temporary agency with liability for the
temporary employee's workers' compensation benefits. Additionally, both
statutes place potential liability on the recipient company (the special
employer or contractor depending on the jurisdiction). Specifically, both
statutes provide that the recipient company must provide workers'
compensation coverage to the temporary employee if the temporary




Despite these similarities, G.L. ch. 152 § 18 and K.R.S. § 342.610(2)
contain significant differences. While section 18 allows the general
employer and special employer to shift liability for workers' compensa-
tion to the recipient company (the special employer) through agreement,
K.R.S. § 342.610(2) does not allow contracting parties such freedom.
Rather, under K.R.S. § 342.610(2), a subcontractor and contractor are
precluded from shifting the subcontractor's (temporary agency's) liability
for workers' compensation.'52 Additionally, unlike G.L. ch. 152 § 18,
under K.R.S. § 342.610(2), if the liability shifts from the temporary
employment agency to the recipient company, the recipient company can
seek indemnification from the temporary employment agency 153
These differences exist because unlike Kentucky, Massachusetts has
recognized a difference between contractor/subcontractor relationships on
the one hand and general employer/special employer relationships on the
other. While G.L. ch. 152 § 18's second paragraph addresses the general
employer/special employer concerns mentioned above, its first paragraph
specifically addresses the contractor/subcontractor relationship. 54 Not
'51 Note that G.L. ch. 152 § 18 also allows the parties to place the primary
liability on the recipient company by agreement.
152 See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sherman & Fletcher, 705 S.W.2d 459
(Ky. 1986).
5 See id. at 463-64.
's4 G.L. ch. 152 § 18's first paragraph provides in relevant part:
If an insured person enters into a contract. with a sub-contractor
and the insurer would, if such work were executed by employees
immediately employed by the insured, be liable to pay compensation
under this chapter to those employees, the insurer shall pay to such
employees any compensation which would be payable to them under
this chapter if the sub-contractors were insured persons The
insurer shall be entitled to recover from the uninsured sub-
contractor all compensation benefits and expenses, medical, hospital or
otherwise, that it has paid or may become obligated to pay on account
of any injury to the employee or employees of any such uninsured
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surprisingly, G.L. ch. 152 § 18's treatment of contractors and subcontrac-
tors is nearly identical to that provided mn K.R.S. § 342.610. That is,
under G.L. ch. 152 § 18, a subcontractor and contractor cannot shift the
subcontractor's liability for workers' compensation. Moreover, under G.L.
ch. 152 § 18, if a contractor pays workers' compensation payments to an
employee of the subcontractor, that contractor is allowed to seek
indemnification from the subcontractor. Evidently, the Massachusetts
legislature appreciated a difference between workers' compensation issues
involving contractors and subcontractors and those involving temporary
employees provided to recipient companies by temporary agencies.
When G.L. ch. 152 § 18 and K.R.S. § 342.610 are paired with their
exclusiveness-of-remedy counterparts, the differences between the two
jurisdictions becomes even more apparent. First, the courts m Kentucky,
as evidenced in U.S.F.&G., interpret K.R.S. § 342.610(2) and K.R.S. §
342.690 to provide the contractor and the subcontractor with statutory
immunity from common law suits by injured employees. Unlike G.L. ch.
152 §§ 15 and 18, K.R.S. §§ 342.610(2) and 342.690 provide the
contractor (special employer) with immunity despite the fact that the
employee is adequately covered by the subcontractor (general employ-
er).155
Take, for instance, a scenario like the one described in the introduc-
tion. Employee number one, a regular employee, and Employee number
two, a temporary employee lent to the company by an agency like
Manpower, are working on an assembly line when both are injured by
machinery that has been negligently maintained. According to the court
in U.S.F.&G., K.R.S. § 342.610(2) and K.R.S. § 342.690 would work
together to provide the recipient company with statutory immunity from
a suit by Employee number two.1 56 The rationale behind such a
decision is that although the temporary employment agency is primarily
liable for workers' compensation payments, the recipient company has
"potential liability" created by the fact that the temporary agency may not
be adequately covered.157 Nevertheless, even when it is shown that the
temporary agency is adequately covered under the Workers' Compensa-




156 Id. at 268-69.
151 If the subcontractoris not adequately covered and the contractorbecomes
liable for the employee's workers' compensation, according to K.R.S. § 342.610,
the contractor may sue the subcontractor for indemnity.
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to mamunity under K.R.S. § 342.690. It does not take long to see that, as
compared to an employer who employs only regular employees,
employers who utilize temporary employees may be at a great advantage.
Assuming that the temporary employment agency in the example above
has adequately covered its employees with workers' compensation, 158
the owner of the manufacturing plant is not only free from paying
Employee number two any workers' compensation payments, but will
also be immune from any common law causes of action Employee
number two might have against him.
While this result may seem strange at first, a closer examination of
the intent behind K.R.S. § 342.610(2) reveals a clearer picture. Tis
statute was written specifically to address the workers' compensation
issues that arise out of a typical contractor/subcontractor relationship. The
statute's primary purpose was to provide contractors an incentive to deal
with and hire subcontractors who were adequately covered with workers'
compensation insurance."5 9 Likewise, by placing primary responsibility
to pay workers' compensation benefits solely on the subcontractor, the
statute provided subcontractors with an incentive to maintain a safe
working environment for their employees.
While this is a noble goal, its application to the atypical working
relationship in which the temporary worker finds himself is somewhat
strained, and its results are often illogical and fundamentally contrary to
the purpose and spirit of the workers' compensation laws. Unlike the
typical subcontractor, most temporary employment agencies are not
present on site. 60 As a result, recipient companies are not in a position,
physically, to maintain a safe working environment, ensure the "temp" is
adequately instructed, or guard against abnormally dangerous job
assignments."' Thus, the intended incentives of K.R.S. § 342.610(2)
"' In today's competitive market for temporary employees, it is unlikely that
an agency will be found to not be adequately covered.
... See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sherman & Fletcher, 705 S.W.2d 459,
461 (Ky. 1986) (stating that "[t]he purpose of the 461 provision of K.R.S.
342.610" providing "that a contractor is liable for compensation benefits if a
subcontractor does not secure compensation benefits is to prevent subcon-
tracting to irresponsible people").
160 See McClure, supra note 17, at 16 (stating "[a]lthough technically the
temporary agency must abide by the same rules as any other employer, the
agency is not on the job site to monitor conditions").
161 In Henderson v. Manpower of Guilford County, 319 S.E.2d 690 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1984), the court held that Manpower and the recipient company should be
consideredjomt employers and thereforejointly liable for workers' compensation
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are not properly effectuated. The temporary worker is engaged on the
recipient company's premises. It is the recipient company who not only
decides what kind of work the temporary employee will perform, but
how that work should be performed. Moreover, because temporary
workers are "only on the job for a few days, they do not know the
[safety] rules, do not know whom to call about suspected infractions
and are often desperate to have the job - and to keep getting jobs
from the agency " 62 For these reasons, "they are unlikely to report
unsafe conditions." 63 On the other hand, the typical subcontractor,
who knows he is primarily liable for workers' compensation, is present
on the work site and is in a better position to guard against worker
injunes.
In addition to the limited statutory incentives in K.R.S. § 342.610(2),
recipient companies are, arguably, provided with adequate incentives to
maintain safe working conditions for temporary employees. First, other
provisions of the workers' compensation laws provide incentives that
motivate the recipient company to maintain a safe working environment
for its permanent employees. Consequently, because the temporary
employees will be working in the same environment as these permanent
employees, they will be adequately protected from unsafe working
conditions.
This argument presupposes two facts: (1) all recipient companies
employ some permanent workers; and (2) temporary employees work side
by side with permanent employees. Both of these underlying assumptions
are not always valid. First, although it would be nearly inpossible to
have a company of nothing but temporary workers, the percentage of
employees that fall into the temporary category is growing at an
payments. The court observed that the recipient company was in a better position
to guard against worker mjury. Judge Phillips wrote, "the dominant purpose of
the Workers' Compensation Act is to protect and compensate employees injured
on their jobs, [so] employers m charge of jobs where work is actually done and
injunes occur should not be absolved of liability "Id. at 694.
162 McClure, supra note 17, at 15-16 ("The Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers union launched a campaign against the use of contract workers m their
industry after finding that some of the worst chemical plant and refinery
accidents involved the use of contract workers. Says the union's legal counsel,
Greg Mooney, 'Part of the problem is that these workers don't receive the same
training to handle emergencies as the regular union workers. And when an
emergency happens, they're not able to even use the same language as the rest




incredible rate."64 Presumably, the percentage of temporary employees
at a typical recipient company will continue to grow as well. Obviously,
as this percentage gets bigger, the first assumption becomes weaker.
Second, there is no guarantee that work assignments given to temporary
employees will place them side by side with the employer's permanent
employees. The very fact that the temporary employee is needed suggests
that there are job responsibilities that the recipient company either does
not have the human resources to handle or refuses to a§Sxgn to the
permanent staff.65
Another argument is that because the recipient company indirectly
pays its temporary employees' workers' compensation premiums, via
costs charged to it by the temporary employment agency, the recipient
company is provided with an incentive, similar to that provided to
subcontractors by K.R.S. § 342.690(2), to keep and maintain a safe
workplace. 16 6 According to this reasoning, a recipient company will be
careful to avoid subjecting temporary employees to dangerous conditions
because if they are injured, the temporary agency's workers' compensa-
tion premums will go up, and this cost will then be reflected m a highe
price charged to the recipient company This economic chain reaction
provides an adequate check on the recipient company's efforts to provide
for a safe work place. 16
This second argument, however, makes little sense when one realizes
how temporary employment agencies pass on increased costs to recipient
compames. When Employee number two is injured while working on
recipient company X's premises, the temporary employment agency does
not raise the price charged to X proportionately Rather, this increase in
costs is passed on to all customers of temporary employment agencies
equally, thus minimizing the economic impact from heightened premium
payments. Like a typical insurance scheme, this method of apportionment
164 See supra notes 15-36.
165 For example, "[o]ne temp interviewed by [the Carolina Alliance for Fair
Employment] reported spending a day reaching into vats of caulking material
with unprotected arms and hands and breathing in scorching vapor without any
mask." McClure, supra note 17, at 15.
166 See Blacknall v. Westwood Corp., 747 P.2d 412 (Or. Ct. App. 1987),
aff'd, 764 P.2d 554 (Or. 1988) (noting that recipient companies must either
directly or indirectly pay workers' compensation premiums).
67 See Robinson v. Omark Indus., 611 P.2d 665, 670 (Or. Ct. App. 1980)
(Thorton, J., dissenting) (opining that the majority's holding would force general
employers to insure against all risks to protect against increased insurance
premiums due to misuse of employee by special employer).
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minimizes the costs associated with certain risk and may provide yet
another incentive for recipient companies to take less seriously their
responsibility for providing safe working conditions.
Given the nature of these realities, as well as the negligible amount
of influence and physical control the recipient company has over the
temporary employee, it seems clear that Kentucky's workers' compensa-
tion laws should provide recipient companies with adequate incentives to
maintain a safe working environment for temporary employees.
CONCLUSION
As previously indicated, the use of temporary employees is growing
at an incredible pace.16 In Kentucky, precedent now mandates that state
courts use K.R.S. §§ 342.610(2) and 342.690 to analyze the exclusivity
issue in the context of the temporary employment relationship. 69 As
made apparent by the Kentucky cases described above, under this
statutory approach it would be difficult to imagine a situation involving
a temporary employment relationship where a court could find that a
temporary employee has retained his right to sue the recipient company
In other words, under Kentucky law, temporary employees almost always
will be barred from brngmg suit against the borrowing employer.170 In
light of the extreme variations that exist from one employee/employer
'6 See supra notes 15-36.
169 See supra notes 37-137 Pursuant to recent amendments to Chapter 342,
temporary employment agencies are now "deemed" the "employer" of their
temporary workers. K.R.S. § 342.615(5) provides that "[a] temporary help
service shall be deemed the employer of a temporary worker and shall be subject
to the provisions of tns chapter." While this new provision reflects the
legislature's awareness of the inherent differences that exists between a
contractor/subcontractor relationship on the one hand and a recipient compa-
ny/temporary employee relationship on the other, its bright line rule is
shortsighted at best. See infra note 171. By providing that temporary employment
agencies are always the employer of their temporary employees, K.R.S. §
342.615(2) places legislative priority on the ease of administration rather than on
ensuring the presence of adequate incentives upon recipient companies to provide
a safe working environment.
170 Arguably, under K.R.S. § 342.650(6), a temporary employee can elect not
to be covered by the Workers' Compensation Act. Under such circumstances, the
temporary employee would not be barred from bringing suit against the
borrowing employer. However, as is the case with permanent employees,




relationship to the next, such a bright-line rule is bad policy 17,
Moreover, usmgK.R.S. §§ 342.610 and 342.690 to analyze a relationship
to which these statutes were not intended to apply has been cumbersome,
overly technical, and inadequate to meet the needs and expectations of
temporary employees. While these statutes serve important functions m
regard to other more typical work settings, they simply are insufficient to
fully address the new demands on the workplace created by the rise m
temporary employment.
Massachusetts' G.L. ch. 152 §§ 15 and 18 provide a better alterna-
tive. Sections 15 and 18 reflect the Massachusetts legislature's awareness
of the special concerns m a temporary employment relationship.
Consequently, these-statutes, in an effort to provide for the overall safety
of temporary workers, effectively create needed incentives for recipient
companies to act responsibly when dealing with temporary employment
agencies and temporary employees.
171 At least one court has recognized the danger of "holding that a labor
broker-customer relationslp will always establish dual employer status as a
matter of law." Kidder v. Miller-Davis Co., 564 N.W.2d 872, 879 n.7 (Mich.
1997) (finding that such a holding would be contrary to the complex nature of
the labor broker relationship, which should be evaluated on a case-by-casebasis.
The court emphasized that "each case turns on its own facts" and "the existence
of a labor broker relationslp in and of itself may not always be dispositive" of
the rights at issue. Id.).
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